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The mesostriatal dopamine system is prominently
implicated in model-free reinforcement learning,
with fMRI BOLD signals in ventral striatum notably
covarying with model-free prediction errors.
However, latent learning and devaluation studies
show that behavior also shows hallmarks of
model-based planning, and the interaction between
model-based and model-free values, prediction
errors, and preferences is underexplored. We de-
signed a multistep decision task in which model-
based and model-free influences on human choice
behavior could be distinguished. By showing that
choices reflected both influences we could then
test the purity of the ventral striatal BOLD signal
as a model-free report. Contrary to expectations,
the signal reflected both model-free and model-
based predictions in proportions matching those
that best explained choice behavior. These results
challenge the notion of a separate model-free
learner and suggest a more integrated computa-
tional architecture for high-level human decision-
making.
INTRODUCTION
A ubiquitous idea in psychology, neuroscience, and behavioral
economics is that the brain contains multiple, distinct systems
for decision-making (Daw et al., 2005; Kahneman, 2003; Loe-
wenstein and O’Donoghue, 2004; Rangel et al., 2008; Redish
et al., 2008; Sloman, 1996). One long-prominent contender,
the ‘‘law of effect,’’ states that an action followed by reinforce-
ment is more likely to be repeated in the future (Thorndike,
1911). This habit principle is also at the heart of temporal-differ-
ence (TD) learning accounts of the dopaminergic system and its
action in striatum (Barto, 1995; Schultz et al., 1997). In the actor-
critic, for instance, a dopaminergic ‘‘reward prediction error’’
(RPE) signal plays the role of Thorndike’s reinforcer, increasing
the propensity to take actions that are followed by positive
RPEs (Maia, 2010; Suri and Schultz, 1999).1204 Neuron 69, 1204–1215, March 24, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.However, it has long been known that the reinforcement prin-
ciple offers at best an incomplete account of learned action
choice. Evidence from reward devaluation studies suggests
that animals can also make ‘‘goal-directed’’ choices, putatively
controlled by representations of the likely outcomes of their
actions (Dickinson and Balleine, 2002). This realizes a sugges-
tion, dating back at least to Tolman (1948), that animals are not
condemned merely to repeat previously reinforced actions.
From the perspective of neuroscience, habits and goal-
directed action systems appear to coexist in different cortico-
striatal circuits. While these systems learn concurrently, they
control behavior differentially under alternative circumstances
(Balleine and O’Doherty, 2010; Dickinson, 1985; Killcross and
Coutureau, 2003). Computational treatments (Balleine et al.,
2008; Daw et al., 2005; Doya, 1999; Niv et al., 2006; Redish
et al., 2008) interpret these as two complementary mechanisms
for reinforcement learning (RL). The TDmechanism is associated
with dopamine and RPEs, and is ‘‘model-free’’ in the sense of
eschewing the representation of task structure and instead
working directly by reinforcing successful actions. The goal-
directed mechanism is a separate ‘‘model-based’’ RL system,
which works by using a learned ‘‘internal model’’ of the task to
evaluate candidate actions (e.g., by mental simulation; Hassabis
and Maguire, 2007; Schacter et al., 2007; perhaps implemented
by some form of preplay; Foster and Wilson, 2006; Johnson and
Redish, 2007).
Barring one recent exception (Gla¨scher et al., 2010) (which
focused on the different issue of the neural substrates of learning
the internal model), previous studies investigating the neural
substrates of model-free and model-based control have not at-
tempted to detect simultaneous correlates of both as these
systems learn concurrently. Thus, the way the controllers
interact is unclear, and the prevailing supposition that neural
RPEs originate from a distinct model-free system remains
untested. Here we exploited the difference between their two
types of action evaluation to investigate the interaction of the
controllers in humans quantitatively, using functional MRI
(fMRI). Model-free evaluation is retrospective, chaining RPEs
backward across a sequence of actions. By contrast, model-
based evaluation is prospective, directly assessing available
future possibilities. Thus, it is possible to distinguish the two
using a sequential choice task.
In theory, the choices recommended by model-based and
model-free strategies depend on their own, separate valuation
A B Figure 1. Task Design
(A) Timeline of events in trial. A first-stage choice between
two options (green boxes) leads to a second-stage choice
(here, between two pink options), which is reinforced with
money.
(B) State transition structure. Each first-stage choice is
predominantly associated with one or the other of the
second-stage states, and leads there 70% of the time.
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strategy, then we can make the clear, testable prediction that
neural signals reflecting either valuation should dissociate from
behavior (Kable and Glimcher, 2007). Correlates of reward
prediction have most repeatedly been demonstrated in fMRI in
two areas: the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and the
ventral striatum (ventral putamen and nucleus accumbens) (Del-
gado et al., 2000; Hare et al., 2008; Knutson et al., 2000, 2007;
Lohrenz et al., 2007; O’Doherty, 2004; Peters and Bu¨chel,
2009; Plassmann et al., 2007; Preuschoff et al., 2006; Tanaka
et al., 2004; Tom et al., 2007). Of these, value-related signals in
mPFC are sensitive to task contingencies, and are thus good
candidates for involvement in model-based evaluation (Hamp-
ton et al., 2006, 2008; Valentin et al., 2007). Conversely, the
ventral striatal signal correlates with an RPE (McClure et al.,
2003a; O’Doherty et al., 2003; Seymour et al., 2004), and on
standard accounts, is presumed to be associated with dopa-
mine and with a model-free TD system. If so, these signals
should reflect ignorance of task structure and instead be driven
by past reinforcement, even though subjects’ behavior, if it is
partly under the control of a separate model-based system,
may be better informed.
Contrary to this hitherto untested prediction, our results
demonstrate that reinforcement-based and model-based value
predictions are combined in both brain areas, and more particu-
larly, that RPEs in ventral striatum do not reflect pure model-free
TD. These results suggest a more integrated computational
account of the neural substrates of valuation.
RESULTS
Behavior
Subjects (n = 17) completed a two-stage Markov decision task
(Figure 1) in which, on each trial, an initial choice between two
options labeled by (semantically irrelevant) Tibetan characters
led probabilistically to either of two, second-stage ‘‘states,’’
represented by different colors. In turn, these both demanded
another two-option choice, each of which was associated
with a different chance of delivering a monetary reward. The
choice of one first-stage option led predominantly (70% of
the time) to an associated one of the two second-stage
states, and this relationship was fixed throughout the experi-
ment. However, to incentivize subjects to continue learningNeuron 69, 120throughout the task, the chances of payoff
associated with the four second-stage options
were changed slowly and independently, ac-
cording to Gaussian random walks. Theory
(Daw et al., 2005; Dickinson, 1985) predictsthat such change should tend to favor the ongoing contribution
of model-based evaluation.
Each subject undertook 201 trials, of which 2 ± 2 (mean ± 1 SD)
trials were not completed due to failure to enter a responsewithin
the 2 s limit. These trials were omitted from analysis.
The logic of the task was that model-based and model-free
strategies for RL predict different patterns by which reward ob-
tained in the second stage should impact first-stage choices
on subsequent trials. For illustration, consider a trial in which
a first-stage choice, uncharacteristically, led to the second-
stage state with which it is not usually associated, and in which
the choice then made at the second stage was rewarded. The
principle of reinforcement would predict that this experience
should increase the probability of repeating the first-stage
choice because it was ultimately rewarded. However, a subject
choosing instead using an internal model of the task’s transition
structure that evaluates actions prospectively would be ex-
pected instead to exhibit a decreased tendency to choose that
same option. This is because any increase in the value of the
rewarded second-stage option will more greatly increase the
expected value of the first-stage option that is more likely to
lead there. This is actually the first-stage option that was not
originally chosen.
Given previous work suggesting the coexistence of multiple
valuation processes in the brain (Balleine et al., 2008; Dickin-
son, 1985), we hypothesized that subjects might exhibit
a mixture of both strategies. First, to see learning effects of
this sort in a relatively theory-neutral manner, we directly as-
sessed the effect of events on the previous trial (trial n) on
the choice on the current trial (trial n+1). The two key events
on trial n are whether or not reward was received, and whether
the second-stage state presented was common or rare, given
the first-stage choice on trial n. We evaluated the impact of
these events on the chance of repeating the same first-stage
choice on trial n+1. For reasons outlined above, a simple rein-
forcement strategy [simulated in Figure 2A using the TD algo-
rithm SARSA(l) for l = 1] predicts only a main effect of reward:
an ultimately rewarded choice is more likely to be repeated,
regardless of whether that reward followed a common or rare
transition. Conversely, a model-based strategy (simulated in
Figure 2B) predicts a crossover interaction between the two
factors, because a rare transition inverts the effect of the
subsequent reward.4–1215, March 24, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 1205
A B C
Figure 2. Factorial Analysis of Choice Behavior
(A) Simple reinforcement predicts that a first-stage choice resulting in reward is more likely to be repeated on the subsequent trial, regardless of whether that
reward occurred after a common or rare transition.
(B) Model-based prospective evaluation instead predicts that a rare transition should affect the value of the other first-stage option, leading to a predicted
interaction between the factors of reward and transition probability.
(C) Actual stay proportions, averaged across subjects, display hallmarks of both strategies. Error bars: 1 SEM.
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of these two factors, in the average across subjects. In order to
study effects that were statistically reliable at the level of the
population, we quantified the effects using hierarchical logistic
regression with all coefficients taken as random effects across
subjects. At the population level, the main effect of reward was
significantly different from zero (p < 1e8, two-tailed), demon-
strating a reinforcement effect. However, the interaction
between reward and the transition probability was also signifi-
cant (p < 5e5), rejecting a pure reinforcement account and
suggesting that subjects take the transition model into account
in making their choices. As both theories predict, there was no
significant main effect of transition likelihood (p = 0.5). Finally,
the constant term was significantly positive (p < 5e12),
suggesting an overall tendency to stick with the same option
from trial to trial, reward notwithstanding (Ito and Doya, 2009;
Kim et al., 2009; Lau and Glimcher, 2005). We also considered
estimates of the effect sizes for each individual within this anal-
ysis (conditional on the group-level parameter estimates); the
effect of rewardwas positive (within the 95%confidence interval)
for 14/17 subjects, and the interaction was positive for 10/17
individuals, including 7 for whom the main effect of reward was
also positive. Together these data suggest that hallmarks of
both strategies are seen significantly at the population level
and within many individuals, but that there may be between-
subject variability in their deployment.
Motivated by these results, we considered the fit of full model-
based and model-free [SARSA(l) TD; Rummery and Niranjan,
1994] RL algorithms to the choice sequences. The former evalu-Table 1. Best-Fitting Parameter Estimates, Shown as Median Plus
b1 b2 a1 a2
25th percentile 2.76 2.69 0.46 0.21
Median 5.19 3.69 0.54 0.42
75th percentile 7.45 5.16 0.87 0.71
Also shown are medians and quartiles for the negative log-likelihood (LL) o
a normalized measure of the degree to which the model explained the choi
1206 Neuron 69, 1204–1215, March 24, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.ates actions by prospective simulation in a learned model; the
latter uses a generalized principle of reinforcement. The general-
ization, controlled by the reinforcement eligibility parameter l, is
that the estimated value of the second-stage state should act as
the same sort of model-free reinforcer for the first-stage choice
because the final reward actually received after the second-
stage choice. The parameter l governs the relative importance
of these two reinforcers, with l = 1 being the special case of Fig-
ure 2A in which only the final reward is important, and l = 0 being
the purest case of the TD algorithm in which only the second-
stage value plays a role.
We also considered a hybrid theory (Gla¨scher et al., 2010) in
which subjects could run both algorithms in parallel and make
choices according to the weighted combination of the action
values that they produce (see Experimental Procedures). We
took the relative weight of the two algorithms’ values into
account in determining the choices to be a free parameter, which
we allowed to vary across subjects but assumed to be constant
throughout the experiment. Thus, this algorithm contains both
the model-based and TD algorithms as special cases, where
one or the other gets all weight. We first verified that the model
fit significantly better than chance; it did so, at p < 0.05 for all
17 subjects (likelihood ratio tests).
Weestimated the theory’s freeparameters individually for each
subject by maximum likelihood (Table 1). Such an analysis treats
each subject as occupying a point on a continuum trading off the
two strategies; tests of the parameter estimates across subjects
seek effects that are generalizable to other members of the pop-
ulation (analogous to the random effects level in fMRI; HolmesQuartiles across Subjects
l p w LL p  r2
0.41 0.02 0.29 167.74 0.17
0.57 0.11 0.39 200.55 0.26
0.94 0.22 0.59 228.22 0.40
f the data at the best fitting parameters, and a pseudo-r2 statistic (p  r2),
ce data.
Table 2. Model Comparisons between Full (Hybrid) Model and Its Special Cases
Classical Bayesian
LL
Number
Favoring Hybrid
Aggregate LRT
Favoring Hybrid log(P(MjD))
Number
Favoring Hybrid
Aggregate Log Bayes
Factor Favoring Hybrid
Exceedance
Probability
hybrid 3364 – – 3564 – – 0.92
TD only 3418 5 c217 = 108
p < 5e15
3594 11 30.0 0.031
model-based
only
3501 14 c251 = 273
p < 5e16
3646 15 82.4 0.0019
l = 0 3452 14 c217 = 176
p < 5e16
3627 16 62.9 0.0012
l = 1 3392 4 c217 = 54.5
p < 1e5
3573 8 8.87 0.049
Shown for each model: raw negative log-likelihood (LL); the number of subjects favoring the hybrid model on a likelihood ratio test (p < 0.05); test
statistic and p value for a likelihood ratio test against the hybrid model, aggregated across subjects; the negative log model evidence –log(P(MjD));
the number of subjects favoring the hybrid model according to the model evidence; the log Bayes factor favoring the hybrid model, in the aggregate
over subjects; and the Bayesian exceedance probability (Stephan et al., 2009), or probability that eachmodel is the most common among the five over
the population.
Table 3. Mixed Effects Parameter Estimates Used for fMRI
Regressors
b1 b2 a1 a2 l p w LL p  r2
4.23 2.95 0.70 0.40 0.63 0.17 mean 0.51
SD 0.31
3702 0.22
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parameters are expected to lie in the unit range), we analyzed
the estimated parameters’ medians using nonparametric tests.
Across subjects, the median weighting for model-free RL values
was 61% (with model-based RL at 39%), which was significantly
different from both 0% and 100% (sign tests, p < 0.005), again
suggesting that both strategies were mixed in the population.
The second important parameter is the reinforcement eligibility
parameter l, which controls the two reinforcement effects in
TD, i.e., the relative influence of the estimated value of the
second-stage state and the ultimate reward on the model-free
value of the first-stage choice. Across subjects, the median esti-
mate forlwas0.57 (significantly different from0and1; sign tests,
p < 0.05), suggesting that at the population level, reinforcement
occurred in part according to TD-like value chaining (l < 1) and
in part according to direct reinforcement (l > 0).
Since analyzing estimates of the free parameters does not
speak to their necessity for explaining data, we used both clas-
sical and Bayesian model comparison to test whether these free
parameters of the full model were justified by data, relative to
four simplifications. We tested the special cases of SARSA(l)
and model-based RL alone, plus the hybrid model, using only
direct reinforcement or value chaining (i.e., with l restricted to
0 or 1). The results in Table 2 show the superiority of the hybrid
model both in the aggregate over subjects and also, in most
tests, for the majority of subjects considered individually. Finally,
we fit the hierarchical model of Stephan et al. (2009) to treat the
identity of the best-fitting model as a random effect that itself
could vary across subjects. The exceedance probabilities from
this analysis, shown in Table 2, indicate that the hybrid model
had the highest chance (with probability 92%) of being the
most common model in the population. The same analysis esti-
mated the expected proportion of each sort of learner in the pop-
ulation; here the hybrid model was dominant (at 48%), followed
by TD at 18%.
Together, these analyses provided compelling support for
the proposition that the task exercised both model-free and
model-based learning strategies, albeit with evidence for indi-vidual variability in the degree to which subjects deploy each
of them. Next, armed with the trial-by-trial estimates of the
values learned by each putative process from the hybrid
algorithm (refit using a mixed-effects model for more stable
fMRI estimates; Table 3), we sought neural signals related to
these valuation processes.Neuroimaging
Blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) responses in
a number of regions—notably the striatum and the mPFC—
have repeatedly been shown to covary with subjects’ value
expectations (Berns et al., 2001; Hare et al., 2008; O’Doherty
et al., 2007). The ventral striatum has been closely associated
with model-free RL, and so a prime question is whether BOLD
signals in this structure indeed reflect model-free knowledge
alone, even for subjects whose actual behavior shows model-
based influences.
To investigate this question, we sought voxels wherein BOLD
activity correlated with two candidate time series. The first time
series was the standard RPE based on model-free TD, using
just the time points of the transition to the second stage and
the delivery of the outcome in order to avoid uncertainty about
the appropriate baseline against which to measure the first-
stage prediction (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures).
The second time series involved subtracting these TD RPEs
from the RPEs that would arise if the predictions had been
model-based rather than model-free (Daw, in press; Friston
et al., 1998; Wittmann et al., 2008).
We adopted this approach (rather than simply including both
model-free and model-based RPEs as explanatory variables)Neuron 69, 1204–1215, March 24, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 1207
A B C
D E F
Figure 3. Neural Correlates of Model-free and Model-Based Valuations in RPE in Striatum
All maps are thresholded at p < 0.001, uncorrected for display.
(A) Correlates of model-free RPE in bilateral striatum (left peak: 12 10 4, right: 10 12 4).
(B) RPE signaling in ventral striatum is better explained by including some model-based predictions: correlations with the difference between model-based and
model-free RPE signals (left: 10 6 12, right: 12 16 8).
(C) Conjunction of contrasts from (A) and (B) (left: 12 10 10, right, 12 16 6).
(D) Region of right ventral striatum where the weight given to model-based valuations in explaining the BOLD response correlated, across subjects, with that
derived from explaining their choice behavior (14 20 6).
(E) Conjunction of contrasts from (A) and (D) (14 20 6).
(F) Scatterplot of the correlation from (D), from average activity over an anatomically defined mask of right ventral striatum. (r2 = 0.28, p = 0.027.)
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also because it encompassed the test of the null hypothesis that
RPE signaling in striatum was purely model-free. If so, then the
signal would be accounted for entirely by the model-free
regressor, and the difference time series should not correlate
significantly. If, however, the BOLD signal reflected pure
model-based values, or any combination of both, then it would
be best described by some weighted combination of the two
regressors; that is, the difference regressor would account for
residual BOLD activity in addition to that accounted for by the
model-free RPE. We tested the conjunction of the two regres-
sors to verify whether BOLD activity in a voxel was indeed signif-
icantly correlated with the weighted sum of both (Nichols et al.,
2005).
Figure 3A shows that BOLD activity correlated significantly
with the model-free RPE time series in left and right ventral stria-
tum (both p < 0.001; except where noted, all reported statistics
are corrected at the cluster level for familywise error due to
whole-brain multiple comparisons). Moreover, this activity was
better characterized, on average, as including some model-
based valuation: the model-based difference regressor loaded
significantly (right, p < 0.005, left, p < 0.05; Figure 3B) in the1208 Neuron 69, 1204–1215, March 24, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.same area (conjunction; right, p < 0.01, whole-brain corrected;
left, p < 0.01, small-volume corrected within an anatomically
defined mask of the bilateral nucleus accumbens; Figure 3C).
Similar results, though less strong, were also observed in
medial/vmPFC, where both model-free RPE (p < 0.001; Fig-
ure 4A) and the difference regressor indicating model-based
valuation (p < 0.01; Figure 4B) correlated significantly with
BOLD activity. However, although the conjunction between
these two maps showed voxels significant at p < 0.001 uncor-
rected, it survived whole-brain multiple comparison correction
for cluster size (at p < 0.005 corrected; Figure 4C) only when
the threshold on the conjunction map was relaxed to p < 0.005
uncorrected. (Note that cluster size correction is valid indepen-
dent of the threshold on the underlying uncorrected map,
although examining additional thresholds implies additional
multiple comparisons; Friston et al., 1993.)
These results suggested that RPE-related BOLD signals in
ventral striatum, and also in vmPFC, reflected valuations
computed at least in part by model-based methods rather than
pure TD. To investigate this activity further, we compared across
subjects neural and behavioral estimates of the degree of reli-
ance on model-based valuation. The neural and behavioral
Figure 4. Neural Correlates of Model-free and
Model-Based Valuations in RPE in mPFC
Maps have been thresholded at p < 0.001 uncorrected
(A and B) or p < 0.005 uncorrected (C) for display. (A)
Correlates of model-free RPE in mPFC (4 66 14). (B) RPE
signaling in mPFC is better explained by including some
model-based predictions: correlations with the difference
between the two RPE signals (4 56 14). (C) Conjunction
of contrasts from (A) and (B) (4 62 12).
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observables, they were measuring the same phenomenon, and
if RPE activity in striatum were related to a behaviorally relevant
mixture of model-based and model-free values, rather than to
one or the other. We measured the degree of model-based
valuation in the neural signal by the effect size estimated for
the model-based difference regressor (with a larger weighting
indicating that the net signal represented an RPE more heavily
weighted toward model-based values). Behaviorally, we
assessed the degree of model-based influence on choices by
the fit of the weighting parameter w in the hybrid algorithm.
Significant correlation between these two estimates was indeed
detected in right ventral striatum (p < 0.0,1 small-volume
corrected within an anatomical mask of bilateral nucleus accum-
bens; Figure 3D); and the site of this correlation overlapped
the basic RPE signal there (p < 0.01, small-volume corrected;
Figure 3E). Figure 3F illustrates a scatterplot of the effect, here
independently re-estimated from BOLD activity averaged over
an anatomically defined mask of right nucleus accumbens. The
finding of consistency between both these estimates helps to
rule out unanticipated confounds specific to either analysis.
All together, these results suggested that BOLD activity in
striatum reflected a mixture of model-free and model-based
evaluations, in proportions matching those that determine
choice behavior. Finally, in order to characterize more directly
this activity and to interrogate this conclusion via an analysis
using different data points and weaker theoretical assumptions,
we subjected BOLD activity in ventral striatum to a factorial anal-
ysis of its dependence on the previous trial’s events, analogous
to that used for choice behavior in Figure 2. In particular, the TD
RPEwhen a trial starts reflects the value expected during the trial
(as in the anticipatory activity of Schultz et al., 1997), which can
be quantified as the predicted value of the top-level action
chosen (Morris et al., 2006). For reasons analogous to those dis-
cussed above for choice behavior, learning by reinforcement as
in TD(l) (for l > 0) predicts that this value should reflect the
reward received following the same action on the previous trial.
However, amodel-based valuation strategy instead predicts that
this previous reward effect should interact with whether the
previous choice was followed by a common or rare transition.
We therefore examined BOLD activity at the start of trials in
right ventral striatum (defined anatomically) as a function of the
reward and transition on the previous trial. For reasons
mentioned above, these signals did not form part of the previ-
ously described parametric RPE analyses. In order to isolate
activity specifically related to the same action that had beenlearned about on the previous trial, we restricted our assessment
to those trials in which the same actionwas chosen twice in a row
(Morris et al., 2006). As seen in Figure 5A, there was amain effect
of reward (p < 0.005), consistent with TD-like valuation. This, to
our knowledge, is the first time that RPEs in BOLD signal have
been directly shown to exhibit learning through an explicit
dependence on previous-trial outcomes (Bayer and Glimcher,
2005). Across subjects, the interaction with the transition proba-
bility—the marker for model-based evaluation—was not signifi-
cant (p > 0.4), but the size of the interaction per subject (taken
as another neural index of the per-subject model-based effect)
correlated with the behavioral index of model-based valuation
(p < 0.02; Figure 5B). This last result further confirmed that stria-
tal BOLD signal reflected model-based valuation to the extent
that choice behavior did. Indeed, speaking to the consistency
of the results, although the two neural estimates reported here
for the extent of model-based valuation in the striatal BOLD
signal (Figures 3F and 5B) were generated from different analyt-
ical approaches, and based on activity modeled at different time
points within each trial, they significantly correlated with one
another (r2 = 0.37; p < 0.01).
DISCUSSION
We studied human choice behavior and BOLD activity in a two-
stage decision task that allowed us to disambiguate model-
based andmodel-free valuation strategies through their different
claims about the effect of second-stage reinforcement on first-
stage choices and BOLD signals. Here, ongoing adjustments
in the values of second-stage actions extended the one-shot
reward devaluation challenge often used in animal conditioning
studies (Dickinson, 1985) and also the introduction of novel goals
as in latent learning (Gla¨scher et al., 2010): they continually
tested whether subjects prospectively adjusted their prefer-
ences for actions leading to a subsequent incentive (here, the
second-stage state) when its value changed. Following Daw
et al. (2005), we see such reasoning via sequential task structure
as the defining feature that distinguishes model-based from
model-free approaches to RL (although Hampton et al., 2006,
and Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010 hold a somewhat different
view: they associate model-based computation with learning
nonsequential task structure as well).
We recently used a similar task in a complementary study
(Gla¨scher et al., 2010) that minimized learning about the rewards
(by reporting them explicitly and keeping them stable) to isolate
learning about the state transition contingencies. Here, inNeuron 69, 1204–1215, March 24, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 1209
A B Figure 5. Factorial Analysis of BOLDSignal at Start
of Trial, from Average Activity over an Anatomical
Mask of Right Nucleus Accumbens
(A) Signal change (relative to mean) as a function of
whether the choice on the previous trial was rewarded or
unrewarded, andwhether that occurred after a common or
rare transition (compare Figure 2C). Error bars: 1 SEM.
(B) Scatterplot of the correlation, across subjects,
between the contrast measuring the size of the interaction
between reward and transition probability (an index of
model-based valuation), and the weight given to model-
based versus model-free valuations in explaining choice
behavior. (r2 = 0.32, p = 0.017).
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subjects) and introduced dynamic rewards to allow us to study
the learning rules by which neural signals tracked them. This,
in turn, allowed us to test an uninvestigated assumption of the
analysis in the previous paper, i.e., the isolation of model-free
value learning as expressed in the striatal PE.
Our previous computational theory of multiple RL systems in
the brain (Daw et al., 2005) focused on a dynamic mechanism
for trading off the reliance on model-based and model-free valu-
ations based on their relative uncertainties. In the current task,
the ever-changing rewards should keep the tradeoff roughly
constant over time, allowing us to focus on the broader two-
system structure of this theory. Rather than confronting the
many (unknown) factors that determine the uncertainties of
each system within each subject, we treated the balance
between the two processes as exogenous, controlled by
a constant free parameter (w) whose value we could estimate.
Indeed, consistent with our intent, there was no significant trend
(analyses not presented) toward progressive habit formation
(Adams, 1982; Gla¨scher et al., 2010).
Nevertheless, consistent with findings from animal learning
(Balleine and O’Doherty, 2010; Balleine et al., 2008; Dickinson,
1985; Dickinson and Balleine, 2002), we found clear evidence
for both TD- and model-like valuations, suggesting that the brain
employs a combination of both strategies. The standard view is
that the two putative systems work separately and in parallel,
a view reinforced by the strong association of the mesostriatal
dopamine systemwithmodel-free RL, and the fact that, in animal
studies, each system appears to operate relatively indepen-
dently when brain areas associated with the other are lesioned
(Killcross and Coutureau, 2003; Yin et al., 2004; Yin et al.,
2005). Also consistent with this idea, previous work (Hampton
et al., 2006, 2008) suggested that model-based influences on
the vmPFC expected value signal, but did not test for additional
model-free influences there, nor conversely, whether model-
based influences also affected striatal RPEs. Here we found
that even the signal most associated with model-free RL, the
striatal RPE, reflects both types of valuation, combined in
a way that matches their observed contributions to choice
behavior. The finding that a similar result in vmPFC was weaker
may reflect the fact that neural signaling there is, in some studies,
better explained by a correlated variable, expected future value,
and not RPE per se (Hare et al., 2008); residual error due to
such a discrepancy could suppress effects there. However, in1210 Neuron 69, 1204–1215, March 24, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.a sequential task these two quantities are closely related, thus,
unlike Hare’s, the present study was not designed to dissociate
them.
Our ventral striatal finding invites a reevaluation of the stan-
dard account of RPE signaling in the brain, because it suggests
that even a putative TD system does not exist in isolation from
model-based valuation. One possibility about what might
replace this account is suggested by contemplating an infelicity
of the algorithm used here for data analysis. In order to reject the
null hypothesis of purely model-free RPE signaling, we defined
a generalized RPE with respect to model-based predictions as
well. However, this augmented signal was nugatory, in the sense
that model-based RPEs played no role in our account of choice
behavior. Indeed, model-based learners do not rely on model-
based RPEs: the learning problem they face—tracking state
transition probabilities and immediate rewards rather than
cumulative future rewards—demands different training signals
(Gla¨scher et al., 2010).
This apparent mismatch encourages consideration of a hybrid
of a different sort. We have so far examined theories in which
model-based and model-free predictions compete directly to
select actions (Daw et al., 2005). However, model-based and
model-free RPEs could also usefully be integrated for training.
For instance, consider the standard actor-critic account (Barto
et al., 1983; Barto, 1995). This uses RPEs derived from model-
free predictions (the critic) to reinforce action selection policies
(the actor). Errors in model-based predictions, if available, could
serve the same purpose. A model-free actor trained, in part, by
such a model-based critic would, in effect, cache (Daw et al.,
2005) or memorize the recommendations of a model-based
planner, and could execute them subsequently without addi-
tional planning.
Thecomputational literature onRL includes some related ideas
in algorithms, such as prioritized sweeping (Moore and Atkeson,
1993),whichcaches the results ofmodel-basedevaluation (albeit
without a model-free component), and Dyna (Johnson and
Redish, 2005; Sutton, 1990), which trains a model-free algorithm
(though offline) using simulated experiences generated from
a world model. In neuroscience, various theories have been
proposed in which a world model impacts the input to the
model-free system (Bertin et al., 2007; Daw et al., 2006a; Doya,
1999; Doya et al., 2002). The architecture suggested here more
closely resembles the ‘‘biased’’ learning hypothesized by Doll
et al. (2009), according to which top-down information (there
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Model-Based Influences on Choices and the Striatumprovidedbyexperimenter instructions rather thana learnedworld
model) modifies the target of model-free RL. Outside the domain
of learning, striatal BOLD responses are indeed affected by
values communicated by instruction rather than experience (Fitz-
gerald et al., 2010; Tom et al., 2007) and also by emotional self-
regulation (Delgado et al., 2008).
Further theoretical work is needed to characterize the different
algorithms suggested by this general architecture. However, in
general, by preserving the overall structure of parallel model-
based and model-free systems—albeit systems that would
exchange information at an earlier level—the proposal of
a model-based critic would appear to remain consistent with
the lesion data suggesting that the systems can function in isola-
tion (Killcross and Coutureau, 2003; Yin et al., 2004, 2005), and
with behavioral data demonstrating that distinct decision
systems may have different properties and can be differentially
engaged in different circumstances (Doeller and Burgess,
2008; Frank et al., 2007; Fu and Anderson, 2008). It also remains
consistent with other fMRI studies (Doeller et al., 2008; Poldrack
et al., 2001; Venkatraman et al., 2009) suggesting that overall
activity in different brain systems associated with either system
canmodulate with time or circumstances, presumably in relation
to the extent that either process is engaged.
Apart from training, a different use for model-based RPEs
would be for online action evaluation and selection. In particular,
Doya (1999) proposed that a world model could be used to
predict the next state following a candidate action, and that
a dopaminergic RPE with respect to that projected state could
then be used to evaluate whether the action was worth taking.
(A related scheme was suggested by McClure et al., 2003b;
Montague et al., 1995, 1996.) RPEs for planning would appear
to be categorically different in timing and content than RPEs
for learning, in that the former are triggered by hypothetical state
transitions and the latter by actual ones, as in the effects
reported here. The Doya (1999) circuit also differs from a full
model-based planner in that it envisions only a single step of
model-based state lookahead; however, to test this limitation
would require a task with longer sequences.
In the present study, as in most fMRI studies of RPEs, our
effects focused on ventral striatum, and we did not see any
correlates of the organization of striatum into components asso-
ciated with different learning strategies as suggested by the
rodent literature (Yin et al., 2004, 2005). Furthermore, although
there is evidence suggesting that RPE effects in the ventral stria-
tal BOLD signal reflect, at least in part, dopaminergic action there
(Knutson and Gibbs, 2007; Pessiglione et al., 2006; Scho¨nberg
et al., 2010), the BOLD signal in striatum likely conflates multiple
causes, including cortical input and local activity, and it is thus
not possible to identify it uniquely with dopamine. Indeed, it is
possible that, even if the effects attributed to our model-free
RPE regressor are dopaminergic in origin, the residual effects
captured by the model-based difference regressor in the same
voxels arise from other sources. The questions raised by the
present study thus invite resolution by testing a similar multistep
task in animals using dopamine unit electrophysiology or voltam-
metry. In this respect, recent results by Bromberg-Martin et al.
(2010) showing that, in a serial reversal task (albeit nonsequen-
tial), a dopaminergic RPE response is more sophisticated thana basic TD theory would predict, provide a tantalizing clue that
our results might hold true of dopaminergic spiking as well.
Overall, by demonstrating that it is feasible to detect neural
and behavioral signatures of both learning strategies, the
present study opens the door to futurewithin-subject studies tar-
geted at manipulating and tracking the tradeoff dynamically, and
thence, at uncovering the computational mechanisms and
neural substrates for controlling it. Such metacontrol of decision
systems is of particular practical importance, because, for
instance, the compulsive nature of drug abuse has been
proposed to result from aberrant expression of habitual control
(Everitt and Robbins, 2005), and similar mechanisms have
also, plausibly, been linked to other serious issues of self-
control, including undersaving and overeating (Loewenstein
and O’Donoghue, 2004).
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Participants and Behavioral Task
Seventeen healthy adults (five female; mean age 25.8 years) participated in this
study. All participants gave written informed consent, and the study was con-
ducted in accordance with the guidelines of the local ethics committee.
The task consisted of 201 trials, in three blocks of 67, separated by breaks.
The events in the trial are sketched in Figure 1A. Each trial consisted of two
stages. In the first stage, subjects used an MRI compatible button box to
choose between two options, represented by Tibetan characters in colored
boxes. If subjects failed to enter a choice within 2 s, the trial was aborted.
The chosen option rose to the top of the screen, while the option not chosen
faded and disappeared. At the second stage, subjects were presented with
either of two more choices between two options (‘‘states’’), and entered
another choice. The second choice was rewarded with money (depicted by
a pound coin, though subjects were paid 20% of this amount), or not (depicted
by a zero). Trials were separated by an intertrial interval of randomized length,
on average about 1 TR.
Which second-stage state was presented depended, probabilistically,
on the first-stage choice, according to the transition scheme shown in Fig-
ure 1B. The assignment of colors to states was counterbalanced across
subjects, and the two options at each state were permuted pseudorandomly
between left and right from trial to trial. Each bottom-stage option was re-
warded according to a probability associated with that option. In order to
encourage ongoing learning, these reward probabilities were diffused at
each trial by adding independent Gaussian noise (mean 0, SD 0.025), with re-
flecting boundaries at 0.25 and 0.75.
In a computerized training session prior to the fMRI task, subjects were in-
structed that the reward probabilities would change, but those controlling the
transitions from the first to the second stage would remain fixed. They were
also instructed about the overall structure of the transition matrix, specifically,
that each first-stage option was primarily associated with one or the other of
the second-stage states, but not which one. Prior to the scanning session,
to familiarize themselves with the structure of the task, subjects played 50 trials
on a practice task using a different stimulus set.
Behavioral Analyses
We first conducted a logistic regression in which the dependent variable was
the first-stage choice (coded as stay versus switch), and the explanatory vari-
ables were the reward received on the previous trial, a binary indicator variable
indicating whether the previous trial’s transition was common or rare, and the
interaction of the two. We took all coefficients as random effects across
subjects, and estimated this multilevel regression using the lme4 linear mixed
effects package (Bates and Maechler, 2010) in the R statistical language
(R Development Core Team, 2010). We also extracted posterior effect size
estimates (conditional on the estimated population-level prior) and confidence
intervals from the posterior covariance for each of the individuals from this fit.
The predictions in Figures 2A and 2B are derived from simulations of SARSA(1)Neuron 69, 1204–1215, March 24, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 1211
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subjects’ data within each class of algorithm.
Computational Model of Behavior
In a second set of analyses, we fit choice behavior to an algorithm that is
similar to the hybrid algorithm of Gla¨scher et al. (2010). In particular, it
learned action values via both model-based RL (explicit computation of Bell-
man’s equation) and by model-free SARSA(l) TD learning (Rummery and Nir-
anjan, 1994), and assumed choices were driven by the weighted combination
of these two valuations. The relative weighting was controlled by a free
parameter w, which we assumed to be constant across trials. We also
computed TD RPEs with respect to both the model-free and model-based
valuations, and, for fMRI analysis, defined a difference regressor as the
difference between them. Full equations are given in Supplemental Experi-
mental Procedures.
Behavioral Estimation
For behavioral analysis, we estimated the free parameters of the algorithm
separately for each subject, to maximize the log-likelihood of the data (from
the log of Equation 2 summed over all trials; see Supplemental Information),
for the choices actually made conditioned on the states and rewards previ-
ously encountered. We constrained the learning rates to lie between zero
and one, but allowed l and w (which also nominally range between zero and
one) to float arbitrarily beyond these boundaries, so as to make meaningful
the tests of whether the median estimates were different from the nominal
boundaries across the population.
For classical model comparison, we repeated this procedure for the nested
subcases, and tested the null hypothesis of the parametric restriction (either
individually per subject or for likelihoods aggregated over the population) using
likelihood ratio tests. For Bayesianmodel comparison, we computed a Laplace
approximation to the model evidence (MacKay, 2003) integrating out the free
parameters; this analysis requires a prior over the parameters, which we took
to be Beta(1.1,1.1) for the learning rates, l and w, Normal(0,1) for p, and
Gamma(1.2,5) for the softmax temperatures, selected so as to be uninforma-
tive over the parameter ranges we have seen in previous studies, and to roll off
smoothly at parametric boundaries. We also fit the model of Stephan et al.
(2009), which takes model identity as a random effect, by submitting the Lap-
lace-approximated log model evidences to the spm_BMS routine from SPM8
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm8/).
Thus, we performed all behavioral analyses assuming the parameters (and in
some cases the model identity) to be random effects across subjects.
However, to generate regressors for neural analyses on a common scale,
we refit the algorithm to the choices, taking only w as a random effect, instan-
tiated once per subject, and assuming common values for the other parame-
ters. This is because in these sorts of algorithms, noise and variation in param-
eter estimates from subject to subject results, effectively, in a rescaling of
regressors between subjects, which suppresses the significance of neural
effects in a subsequent second-level fMRI analysis, producing poor results
(Daw, in press; Daw et al., 2006b; Gershman et al., 2009; Scho¨nberg et al.,
2007, 2010).
fMRI Procedures
Functional imaging was conducted using a 1.5T Siemens Sonata MRI scan-
ner to acquire gradient echo T2*-weighted echo-planar images (EPI)
with BOLD contrast. Standard preprocessing was performed; see Supple-
mental Experimental Procedures for full details of preprocessing and
acquisition.
fMRI Analysis
The fMRI analysis was based around the time series of model-free and model-
based RPEs as generated from the simulation of themodel over each subject’s
experiences. We defined two parametric regressors—the model-free RPE,
and the difference between the model-free and model-based RPEs. The latter
regressor characterizes how net BOLD activity would differ if it were correlated
with model-based RPEs or any weighted mixture of both. For each trial,
the RPE time series were entered as parametric regressors modulating
impulse events at the second-stage onset and reward receipt. To test the1212 Neuron 69, 1204–1215, March 24, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.correspondence between behavioral and neural estimates of themodel-based
effect, we also included the per-subject estimate of the model-based effect
(w, above) from the behavioral fits as a second-level covariate for the differ-
ence regressor. A full description of the analysis is given in Supplemental
Experimental Procedures.
For display purposes, we render activations at an uncorrected threshold of
p < 0.001 (except relaxing this in one case to p < 0.005), overlaid on the
average of subjects’ normalized structural images. For all reported statistics,
we subjected these uncorrected maps to cluster-level correction for family-
wise error due to multiple comparisons over the whole brain, or, in a few cases
(noted specifically), over a small volume defined by an anatomical mask of
bilateral nucleus accumbens. This mask was hand-drawn on the subject-
averaged structural image, according to the guidelines of Breiter et al. (Ball-
maier et al., 2004; Breiter et al., 1997; Scho¨nberg et al., 2010)—notably,
defining the nucleus’ superior border by a line connecting the most ventral
point of the lateral ventricle to the most ventral point of the internal capsule
at the level of the putamen. Conjunction inference was by the minimum t
statistic (Nichols et al., 2005) using the conjunction null hypothesis. The differ-
ence regressor was orthogonalized against the RPE regressor, so that up to
minor correlation that can be reintroduced by whitening and filtering, it
captured only residual variation in BOLD activity not otherwise explained by
the model-free RPE. However, note that conjunction inference via the
minimum t statistic is valid even when the conjoined contrasts are not inde-
pendent (Nichols et al., 2005).ROI Analyses
We also used the right-hemisphere portion of the mask of nucleus accumbens
(right being the side on which we have previously observed stronger RPE
activity; e.g., Daw et al., 2006b; Wittmann et al., 2008) to define the ROI for
two analyses conducted with the MarsBaR ROI toolbox (Brett et al., 2002).
First, average activity from the region was extracted and subjected to the
same analysis as described above, to produce Figure 3F. Second, the activity
from the region was subject to a second regression analysis using a different
design, which tagged the first-stage onset of each trial with an impulse
regressor of one of five types: switches (trials on which the opposite first-stage
choice from the one on the previous trial was made) and stays (four types of
events modeling all combinations of the factors reward versus nonreward
and common versus rare transition in the previous trial). An additional nuisance
regressor was included at the time of outcomes. Per-subject effect sizes
for the four stay regressors were subject to a 2 3 2 repeated-measure
ANOVA, and, additionally, the value for each subject of the contrast measuring
the interaction of the two factors ([reward/common minus nonreward/
common] minus [reward/rare minus nonreward/rare]) was correlated with the
weight given to model-based values (the estimated parameter w) from the
behavioral fit.SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
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